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UNSCRUPULOUS AGENTS AND
THE AMATEUR ATHLETE
James C. Crowley IV
Cullen C. Gault'
I. INTRODUCTION
America is sports crazy. National corporations use sports stars to
promote their products. Television companies fill weekend broadcast time
with professional and collegiate basketball, football and baseball as well as
numerous other sports like golf, bowling, and auto racing. Sports trading
cards, autographed collectibles and officially licensed sporting apparel
generate huge revenues.
The mass marketing appeal of sports and sport stars has led to
increasing profits, resulting in escalating salaries for professional athletes'
and larger fees for sports agents. For example, former University of Notre
Dame football player Raghib "Rocket" Ismail, now with the Los Angeles
Raiders of the National Football League, originally signed out of college
for a reported $26,000,000 multi-year contract with the Toronto Argonauts
of the Canadian Football League.2 An agent who charged the standard
three percent fee to negotiate the contract would have received approxi-
mately $800,000. The possibility of earning that amount of money for
representing athletes is inviting. So inviting in fact, that it has lead some
agents to use unscrupulous and illegal tactics to convince athletes to sign
personal representation contracts with them.
The illegal activities of several agents in college football are well
documented. In October of 1986 agent David Lueddeke paid Cris Carter,
then an Ohio State wide receiver, $5000 to sign a representation contract 3
This action violated National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
* James C. Crowley IV, Esq., is a partner with the firm of Kondritzer, Gold, Frank &
Crowley, L.P.A., in Cincinnati, Ohio. Mr. Crowley is a sports attorney and has served as
president of the Cincinnati Bar Association Sports Law Committee.
** Cullen C. Gault, Esq., received his B.S.E.E. from the University of Kentucky and is a
graduate of Salmon P. Chase College of Law. He is a member of the Kentucky Bar.
1. See R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BUstNESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIs § 1.30
(1986).
2. Bruce Dowbiggin, The Wizard of Awe, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 14, 1991, at KI.
3. Agent Sentenced to 26 Months, CI. TRIE., Apr. 29, 1989, at C4.
44 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
regulations and several state laws.4 In 1987, Alabama sports agent Jim
Abernethy violated NCAA rules by giving Auburn University cornerback
Kevin Porter $2900.1 This violation disqualified Porter from Auburn's
Sugar Bowl game against Syracuse University.6 The Los Angeles Times
reported that Bruce Allen's sports agency, GBA Sportsworld, violated
NCAA rules by signing two University of Nevada at Las Vegas football
players to representation contracts before their senior years." However,
college football players are not the only student-athletes targeted by
unscrupulous agents.
When college basketball season rolls around, sports agents make
numerous phone calls to top players. Phil Taylor, a Sports Illustrated
contributor, noted, "It's getting increasingly difficult for college players,
even non-seniors, to avoid being approached by agents at this time of
year."' New Jersey Nets point guard Kenny Anderson changed his phone
number while a sophomore at Georgia Tech because of constant phone calls
from agents encouraging him to leave school early to enter the NBA draft.9
While a junior at the University of California at Los Angeles, Washington
Bullets recent draftee Don MacLean explained the phone calls he received:
"The same guys keep calling. It gets bothersome. And it's a distraction,
something I don't want to concentrate on right now. Nobody's telling me
whether to go pro or not. Mostly they want to get an edge, develop a
relationship. It's really ridiculous."'"
The above examples, while certainly not exhaustive, demonstrate the
need for control and regulation of unscrupulous agents. This article will
first examine the effectiveness of the NCAA, professional player associa-
tions, and state laws which purport to protect the amateur and student-
athlete from unprincipled agents. Second, this article will analyze state
athlete agent registration laws, which provide protection to athletes, but
may not be constitutional under Commerce Clause or Due Process analysis.
Finally, this article proposes a Model Federal Sports Act as a solution to
4. Id.
5. Game-Tampering Conviction Dismissed by Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1988, at
C7.
6. Id.
7. Danny Robbins & Elliott Almond, Bruce Allen's Partner Provided Access to UNLV
Players, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1990, at C12. Bruce Allen, the owner of GBA Sportsworld, built
his business with UNLV players through influence gained as the son of former Washington
Redskins coach George Allen and having a former UNLV coach as a partner. Id.
8. Phil Taylor, Just Say No, SPORTS BILsTRATED, Mar. 11, 1991, at 52.
9. Id
10. Id.
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protecting athletes.
II. TBE NCAA AND PROFESSIONAL PLAYERS ASSOCIATIONS
The NCAA and other collegiate athletic associations offer some
protection for the amateur athlete. Similarly, the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA), National Football League Players Associa-
tion (NFLPA), and National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) are
professional player associations that have rules to protect the professional
athlete by detering unscrupulous agent conduct. But those organizations do
not provide the amateur or student-athlete with protection from agents. The
following discussion about the NCAA, MLBPA, NBPA and NFLPA is not
all-inclusive as to the full scope of each organizations' rules and regula-
tions. Rather this survey provides a basic summary of the associations and
their application to the regulation of agents.
A. National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Regulations
The NCAA rules indicate that the student-athlete should be protected
from agents." However, the NCAA has not accomplished this purpose
in each instance. Because the NCAA has no authority to discipline an
agent, the NCAA must try to control agents by punishing either the student-
athlete and, if appropriate, the member school. Under NCAA regulations
a student-athlete is forbidden from signing a representation contract with an
agent" or accepting gifts from an agent. 3 The NCAA also attempts to
control agents by encouraging member schools to set up Career Counseling
Panels. 4 The Career Counseling Panels provide guidance to student-
11. See NCAA Constitution § 2.6, reprinted in 1991-92 NCAA MANUAL 4.
12. See NCAA Operating Bylaws § 12.3.1.1, reprinted in 1991-92 NCAA MANUAL 72.
Bylaw § 12.3.1.1 states:
An individual shall be ineligible ... if he or she enters into a verbal or written
agreement with an agent for representation in future professional sports negotiations
that are to take place after the individual has completed his or her eligibility in that
sport.
13. The bylaws further state:
An individual shall be ineligible... if he or she (or his or her relatives or friends) accepts
transportation or other benefits from any person who wishei to represent the individual in
the marketing of his or her athletics ability. The receipt of such expenses constitutes
compensation based on athletics skill and is an extra benefit not available to the student
body in general. Id
14. Id § 12.3.4.
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athletes regarding future professional athletic careers."5 The panel may
review a professional sports contract, provide guidance in the selection of
an agent or use an outside attorney to review a professional sports con-
tract.' 6 Hopefully, the panel's advice and assistance to a student-athlete
will deter improper agent conduct.
B. Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA)
Regulations Governing Player Agents
The MLBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents (MLBPA
Regulations) consist of six sections.'"
1. Scope of MLBPA Regulations
This section allows a registered agent or a player representing himself
to perform negotiations with a major league club.'9
2. Requirements for Certification;
Grounds for Denying Certification
The initial requirements for agent certification are Filing a "Verified
Application and Certification Statement' and the player's written notific-
ation to the MLBPA of the desire to retain the applicant as an agent. °
Grounds for denying an agent's certification are: (1) non-compliance
with the MLBPA Regulations; (2) providing any misrepresentations or false
statements on the application; (3) misappropriating any funds or (4)
engaging in conduct that might affect the agents ability to act on behalf of
players.
2 1
15. Id
16. 1d
17. The Career Counseling Panels are just beginning. Thomas 0. Keefe, Athlete Agent,
Remarks at Cincinnati Bar Ass'n Sports Law Seminar, (Oct. 11, 1991).
18. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS Ass'N, GovERNINo PLAYER AGENTS § 1-6 (1980).
The MLBPA is the bargaining unit for its players under the National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a)
and the MLBPA collective bargaining agreement. Id § 1-2.
19. Id § 2-3.
20. Id § 3.
21. Id § 4-5. The agent may be granted temporary certification beyond the initial 45 days
if it is in the best interests of the player. Id § 4.
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3. Standard of Conduct for Player Agents;
Prohibited Conduct
Some general conduct requirements of agents are: (1) to fully dis-
close all pertinent information; (2) to annually attend an MLBPA seminar;
(3) to comply with the fee limitations; and (4) to provide the player and the
association with an itemized statement that sets forth fees and expenses
covering the previous year.'
Prohibited conduct with regard to amateur or professional athletes that
can result in disciplinary actions include the following: (1) the agent may
not give anything of value to a player or any other person to induce or
encourage the player to utilize the agent's services; and (2) the agent may
not provide any false or misleading information to a represented or unrepre-
sented player.'
4. Agreements Between Players and Agents
In order to serve as a player's agent, the agent and player must enter
into a written contract in plain, understandable language that specifies fees
and services.'
22. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, GovERNn o PLAYER AGENTS § 6-7 (1980).
23. IM. § 3-8. The pertinent parts of section 3-8 regarding the amateur athlete are:
(2) Providing or causing to be provided money or any other thing of value to any
Player (including a minor league player or amateur athlete), the purpose of which
is to induce or encourage such Player to utilize the Player Agent's services;
(3) Providing or causing to be provided money or any other thing of value to (a)
a member of a Player's (including a minor league player's or amateur athlete's)
family, or (b) any other person (other than a person in the regular and principal
employ of the Player Agent), the purpose of which is to induce or encourage such
Player or any other Player (including a minor league player or amateur athlete) to
utilize the Player Agent's services [or]
(4) Providing or causing to be provided materially false or misleading information
to any Player (including a minor league player or amateur athlete) either in the
context of seeking to be selected as a Player Agent for such Player or any other
Player (including a minor league player or amateur athlete), or in the course of
representing a player as his agent.
Id.
24. Id. § 3-10. The fees an agent receives will not make the players net salary less than the
league minimum and will not count toward unearned bonuses. Fee restrictions do not apply to
professional free agents negotiating new contracts. Id § 3-1I.
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5. Arbitration
It is the intent of the MLBPA that the impartial arbitration process
shall be the exclusive method for resolving any and all disputes between
players and agents that arise out of agreements or contracts between them
and any disputes concerning denial, revocation, or suspension of an agent's
certification.'
6. Effective Date and Amendment
The MLBPA regulations became effective June 17, 1988, and may be
amended by the MLBPA's Executive Board.26
C. National Basketball Players Association (NBPA)
Regulations Governing Player Agents
The NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents (hereinafter NBPA
Regulations) consists of seven sections.2" The purpose of the NBPA
Regulations is to increase recognition among NBA players of the need to
insure that agents representing players (including rookies) in individual
contract negotiations with NBA clubs provide high quality services at fair
and equitable fee levels and establish a program for assisting players and
rookies in selecting individual agents.'
1. Scope of the NBPA Regulations
The NBPA Regulations provide that a player may represent himself,
but if an agent is to represent a player, the agent must be certified
according to the NBPA Regulations."
25. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS (1980) § 3-12-
18. The rules of procedure of hearing shall be established by the Impartial Arbitrator and, to the
extent deemed practicable by him, shall conform to the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Id. § 3-14.
26. Id. § 3-18.
27. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS §
1-7 (1990). The NBPA is the bargaining agent of its players under the National Labor Relations
Act, section 9(a) and the NBPA's collective bargaining agreement. IL § 1.
28. Id. at Foreword.
29. Id. § 2.
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2. Requirements for Certification
This section requires an agent to submit an NBPA Application for
Certification.30  The grounds for denying certification are essentially the
same as those stated in the MLBPA Regulations, section 2.3'
3. Standards of Conduct for Player Agents in Providing
Services Governed by the NBPA Regulations
General requirements for agent conduct are basically the same as set
forth in the MLBPA Regulations, section 3.32 Another similar provision
is the NBPA's prohibition on an agent's conduct with respect to an amateur
or professional athlete.33
4. Agreements Between Player Agents and Player;
Maximum Fees
In order to perform the services as an agent under the NBPA
Regulations a person must: (1) be certified; and (2) have signed a written
NBPA agreement with the player.T This section also sets forth the
30. Id. § 2-3. If it is in the player's best interest, an agent may be temporarily certified or
the committee may extend the certification process an additional thirty (30) days. Id.
31. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
33. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTs §
3-5. The pertinent parts with regard to an agent's conduct toward an amateur athlete are:
b) Providing or offering a monetary inducement (other than a fee less than the
maximum fee contained in the standard fee agreement established by these
Regulations) to any player (including a rookie) or college athlete to induce or
encourage that person to utilize his services;
c) Providing or offering money or anything of value to a member of a player's
family or another person for the purpose of inducing or encouraging the player to
utilize his services or for the purpose of inducing or encouraging that person to
recommend that a player (including a rookie) or college athlete utilize the services
of the agent; [and)
d) Providing materially false or misleading information to any player (including a
rookie) or college athlete in the context of seeking to be selected as a player agent
for that individual or in the course of representing that player as his agent.
Id.
34. Id. § 3-6.
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maximum fees the player agent may charge or collect.
35
5. Arbitration Procedures
Arbitration procedures are essentially the same as the MLBPA
Regulations, section 536
6. Oversight and Compliance Procedure
This section establishes a Disciplinary Committee responsible for
initiating and presenting disciplinary cases against player agents who
engage in prohibited conduct.3
7. Effective Date; Amendment
These NBPA Regulations became effective on March 1, 1990, and the
may be amended periodically by action of the officers of the NBPA and the
player representatives.3"
D. National Football League Players Association Code (NFLPA Code)
of Conduct for NFLPA Member Contract Advisors
On November 6, 1989, the NFLPA reorganized itself from an
exclusive collective bargaining agent for NFL players to a professional
association partially dedicated to protecting the individual contracting rights
of professional football players.39 Even though the NFLPA adopted the
Code of Conduct for Member Contract Advisors (NFLPA Code),
membership is voluntary and the NFLPA only recommends that NFL
35. lId § 3-7. The agent receives a $2000 fee representing a player who signs a contract for
the league minimum. If an agent negotiates a contract for over the league minimum, the agent
receives a maximum 4% fee.
Id.
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS'N, REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS §
6, at 10-12.
38. Id § 6-12.
39. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR NFLPA MEMBER
CONTRAcr ADVISORS §§ 1-6 (1990) [hereinafter NFLPA CODE].
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players use these agents.4' The NFLPA Code consists of six sections.4"
1. Scope of Code of Conduct
This section applies to agents negotiating contracts with NFL clubs or
providing financial services to an NFL player.42 An NFL player includes
anyone eligible to play in the NFL, including rookies.43
2. Requirements for Membership
An agent who wishes to become a Member Contract Advisor must
file an NFLPA standardized application.'
3. Code of Conduct
The Code of Conduct requires that an agent sign an NFLPA
Representative Agreement with the player.45 This contract allows an agent
to represent the player in negotiations with an NFL club and determines the
services the agent will provide as well as the agent's fees and the state law
governing the contract.46
The guidelines on conduct toward an athlete resulting in disciplinary
action are essentially the same as those of the MLBPA Regulation section
347
40. Id. § 1.
41. Id. §§ 1-6.
42. Id. § 1A-F.
43. Id. § 1.
44. NATIONAL FOOTBALLLEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N, CODE OF CONDUcr FOR NFLPA MEMBER
CONTRACT ADvIsORS § 2. The application process may be extended 30 days beyond the initial
45 day period. Id.
45. NFLPA CODE, supra note 39, § 3A(1).
46. Id. at Exhibit C. The choice of state law governing the contract could be important in a
state with an athlete agent registration law. The only fee limitation is at what point the agent may
collect. Id.
47. Id. § 3B(3). The pertinent sections regarding agent conduct toward amateur athletes are:
(a) Provide or offer to provide anything of significant value to a player in order to
become the Member Contract Advisor for such player,
(b) Provide or offer to provide anything of significant value to any other person in
return for a personal recommendation of the Member Contract Advisor's selection
by a player,
(c) Provide materially false or misleading information to any person in the context
of solicitation for selection as the Member Contract Advisor for any player.
1993]
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4. Oversight and Compliance Procedure
This section establishes a three-person Disciplinary Committee which
initiates disciplinary procedures against member agents who violate the
NFLPA Code.'
5. Arbitration Procedure
Arbitration procedures are essentially the same as those in the
MLBPA Regulation section 5.49
6. Effective Date; Amendments
The NFLPA Code became effective April 1, 1990, and may be
amended by the NFLPA Board of Player Directors.50
E. Summary
The MLBPA, NFLPA, and NBPA provide professional athletes with
economic remedies for injuries, protection against excessive fees and
adequate agent representation. The only protection for collegiate or
amateur athletes is prohibition on agents' actions during the signing of an
athlete to a professional sports contract." The NCAA and like organiza-
tions are ineffective in regulating agents because the NCAA rules are only
enforceable against amateur athletes and/or member schools. Thus, profes-
sional player associations and the NCAA cannot and do not sufficiently
protect collegiate or amateur athletes from unscrupulous agents.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE
ATHLETE AGENT REGISTRATION LAWS
The high profile case of United States v. Walters52 brought public
attention to the unscrupulous conduct of agents toward amateur and
48. NFLPA CODE, supra note 39, § 4.
49. Id. § 5, see also supra note 25.
50. Id. § 6.
51. See supra notes 23, 33 and 47.
52. 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990).
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collegiate athletes. Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom were agents who
covertly represented college football players. The agents violated NCAA
rules by signing college players to representation contracts and giving them
financial assistance.53 As a result, the government brought a seven-count
indictment against them,' including mail fraud and conspiracy charges.55
The lower court found Walters and Bloom guilty on five of the seven
counts.56 However, the court of appeals reversed and remanded because
the lower court erred by instructing the jury on Walter's advice-of-counsel
defense and denying Bloom's motion for a separate trial."' The publicity
of the Walters and Bloom case," as well as other instances of income
mismanagement, 59 excessive fees,6° conflicts of interest,6 ' and unethical
tactics to recruit athletes,62 encouraged fifteen states to pass athlete agent
registration laws,63 and eight states to pass laws affecting athlete agents.64
The fifteen states responded by enacting agent registration laws in part
because the NCAA and professional player associations failed in their
attempts to govern athlete agents. The main purpose of the laws is to
protect the interest of academic institutions, student athletes and athletes in
53. i at 390.
54. 1d.
55. 1d.
56. Id.
57. United States v. Waiters, 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cit. 1993).
58. See, e.g., Sports People: College Football; New Trials for Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
1991, at B9. See also Newswire: Jurisprudence, LA. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at C6.
59. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Athlete Agent Regulation: Proposed Legislative Revisions and
the Need for Reforms Beyond Legislation, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 85, 87 & n.12 (1989).
60. Id. at n.13.
61. Id. at 85, 87, 88 & nn.12-14.
62. Id at 88 & n.15.
63. ALA. CODE §§ 8-26-1 to -41 (Supp. 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 17-48-101 to -203
(Michie 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1500-1547 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.451-.457
(West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-4A-1 to -19 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 9A.1-.12 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:421-30 (West 1987 & Supp.
1991); MD. Bus. Occ. & PROF. CODE ANN. §§ 632-640 (Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-
41-1 to -23 (1989 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78C-71 to -81 (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit 70, §§ 821.61-.71 (West 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-102-10 to -50 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1990); T x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-518
to -525 (Michie Supp. 1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 18 (West 1989).
64. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-1-1 to -31 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990) (boxing and wrestling
only); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 229.011-.991 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990) (boxing
and wrestling only); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 le (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
325E.33 (West Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 398.005-.095 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4771.01-.99 (Anderson Supp. 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107 (Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-7-2101 to -2109 (Supp. 1990).
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general from being misguided and deceived.'
Some of the common features of the fifteen athlete agent registration
laws are: (1) a registration form, which includes the applicant's name and
address, business or occupation and training qualifying the applicant to be
an agent; (2) a registration filing fee for initial or renewal registration; (3)
a background check; and (4) a penalty for violations.'
A. State Athlete Agent Registration Laws and the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
Thus far, none of the enacted athlete agent registration laws have been
challenged as unconstitutional. However, such a challenge could come
under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution states that Congress shall have the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."'6  Congress has the ultimate authority in regulation of
interstate commerce, and the regulation of the sports industry is recognized
as interstate commerce."' Hughes v. Oklahoma69 established a test for
state or local regulation of interstate commerce. However, the practicing
attorney should recognize that there is other applicable case law.0
The Hughes v. Oklahoma test consists of three prongs. In order to
invoke the Commerce Clause, state law must discriminate against out-of-
state commerce either on its face or in practical effect. Then the burden
falls on the state to demonstrate that the law "serves a legitimate local
purpose" and that this purpose could not be served as well by "less
restrictive alternatives."71 If the state meets its burden under the last two
prongs, the law is valid under the Commerce Clause. The following are
examples of how the Hughes v. Oklahoma test can be applied, using the
existing Florida and Oklahoma athlete agent registration laws. In both
instances, the first element of the Hughes v. Oklahoma test is met because
65. See generally Shropshire, supra note 59, at 89-93.
66. See supra note 63.
67. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 419 (Ct. App. 1985). cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
69. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
70. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTrroNAL LAw §§ 6-14 (2d ed. 1988)
(stating that "a corporation organized in one state seeking to do business in another state may be
required by the latter to qualify under its laws as a 'foreign corporation' before doing business
there"). See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
71. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 336.
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both the Florida and Oklahoma athlete agent registration laws discriminate
against out-of-state commerce.
The Oklahoma law may be discriminatory on its face against nonresi-
dent athlete agents because the statute explicitly states that attorneys
licensed to practice law in the state are exempt from the statute.7
2
Conversely, the nonresident agent must pay a registration fee of $1000 and
provide a $100,000 surety bond."
The Florida law is discriminatory in practical effect against nonresi-
dent athlete agents who have the financial burden of advancing up to a
$500 registration fee to sign perhaps one athlete. 4 In contrast, Florida
resident agents have the benefit of proximity to instate athletes while
paying the same registration fee. Essentially, the law may have a chilling
effect, in that agents from out of state may be less inclined, and less able,
to risk $500 along with the attendant expenses that come with doing
business long distance, for a chance at signing only one athlete. Thus, the
Florida and Oklahoma athlete agent laws appear to be discriminatory.
The second element of the Hughes v. Oklahoma test requires the state
to demonstrate that the law serves a legitimate local purpose. The asserted
legitimate local purpose is to protect the interests of athletes and academic
institutions by regulating the activities of athlete agents involving student-
athletes at colleges or universities.' Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that a court would find that the Florida and Oklahoma athlete agent statutes
serve a "legitimate local purpose."
To meet the third element of the Hughes v. Oklahoma test, the state
must show there are no less restrictive alternatives. Because the maximum
$500 registration fee appears reasonable to cover administrative costs,76
the Florida statute appears to offer no less restrictive alternative.
Conversely, the Oklahoma statute has less restrictive alternatives. The
$1000 registration fee is double that of any other state.' The requirement
of the $100,000 surety bond78 is likewise burdensome because other states
require a surety bond only if in agent enters into a financial services
contract with the athlete, as opposed to a "pure representation contract" for
72. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.71 (West 1989).
73. Id. § 821.62.
74. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.453 (West 1991).
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.451 (West 1991).
76. See id. The statute allows for a maximum fee of $500. ld§ 468.453(1).
77. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70. § 821.62 (West 1989).
78. I&
1993]
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negotiations. 9 Thus, while the Florida statute may pass this prong of the
Hughes v. Oklahoma test, the Oklahoma statute probably does not.
The creation of athlete agent registration laws in fifteen states should
serve as a "red flag" to Congress that states are serious about regulating
unscrupulous agents. Alabama fined unregistered (Texas) agent Lance
Luchinick $5000 for representing University of Alabama linebacker Keith
McCants in NFL negotiations.80 Texas fined Team America, a Nebraska
sports marketing firm, under the Texas registration law for illegally
contacting then University of Houston quarterback Andre Ware." These
incidents demonstrate how state athlete agent registration laws can work to
deter problem agents. However, because of possible Commerce Clause
challenges previously discussed, there exists the possibility of invalidation
for state athlete agent registration laws.
B. State Athlete Agent Registration Laws and the Due Process Clause
The athlete agent registration laws of the fifteen states apply to both
registered and unregistered agents. 2 However, an agent should not fear
prosecution for merely visiting an athlete in one of these states. These laws
present problems only for nonresident, unregistered agents.
In general, the agent's initial action is to visit athletes and convince
them to sign a representation agreement.83 The signed contract allows the
agent to represent the athlete in negotiations with a professional club."
If a nonresident, unregistered agent visits an athlete in a state with an
athlete agent registration law, the forum state can bring suit against the
agent. However, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
79. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-9 (1989 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-72
(1992); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (West Supp. 1991).
80. Briefs, CHL TRIB., May 22, 1990, at C3.
81. Sports Agency Fined $10,000 over Ware Contact, UPI, Feb. 6, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
82. See supra note 63.
83. R. YASSER, ET AL, SPORTS LAw 237-39 (1990).
84. Id.
85. See ALA. CODE § 8-26-41 (Supp. 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-48-102 (Michie 1989);
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1547 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.453 (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 43-4A-11 (Michie 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.11 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 4:426 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MD. Bus. REG. CODE ANN. § 4-424, MD. Bus.
OCC. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 639 (Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-15 (1989 & Supp.
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-78 (1990); OKCLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.66 (West 1989); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 59-102-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (West
Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-523 (Michie Supp. 1990).
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may limit a state court's in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident,
unregistered agent.86
The modem rule governing the scope of a court's in personam
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is the "minimum contacts test".Y
The forum state may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant where an alleged injury arises out of or relates to88 actions
purposefully directed toward forum residents. 9 However, the state may
not exercise in personam jurisdiction if the maintenance of the suit becomes
too burdensome on the defendant. 9°
1. Due Process Application to Contracts
Burger King v. Rudzewicz applied the "minimum contacts test" to
contracts. The Supreme Court in Burger King evaluated (1) prior
negotiations, (2) future contemplations, (3) terms of the contract and (4) the
parties' actual course of business to determine whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state.' The
Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz discussed whether the Burger King
Corporation of Florida could bring suit in a Florida district court against a
Michigan franchisee. 3
Burger King originally fied suit alleging breach of franchise obliga-
tions and trademark infringement when the franchisee stopped sending
payments but continued to operate. 4 The franchisee claimed the Florida
district court lacked jurisdiction. 5 The trial court held for Burger King,
but the court of appeals reversed, and held that jurisdiction under these
86. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
87. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
88. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
89. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
90. The burden on the defendant to appear in a particular locality will be considered in light
of other relevant factors:
1) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute,
2) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,
3) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy
and 4) the public interest in furthering substantive social policies.
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
91. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
92. d. at 479.
93. IdM at 468.
94. Id. at 463, 468.
95. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,469 (1985).
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circumstances would be a burden on the franchisee. 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. In overturning
the court of appeals, the Court found that the Michigan franchisee
purposefully established minimum contacts in Florida.' The Court found
that the Michigan franchisee met the four elements of the "minimum
contacts test' by (1) negotiating the franchise agreement with Burger
King's corporate headquarters in Florida;" (2) signing a twenty-year
franchise agreement;" (3) the contract terms stating that "(the contract)
shall be deemed made and entered into in the State of Florida and shall be
governed and construed under and in accordance with the laws of the State
of Florida"1' and (4) sending payments directly to corporate headquarters
in Florida.1"' Therefore, the Supreme Court held, the district court was
correct in asserting that Florida had in personam jurisdiction over the
franchisee.
2. Due Process Possible Application to Nonresident,
Unregistered Agents
The Cincinnati Bar Association's Sports Law Committee' °2 an-
swered questionnaires to determine a fact pattern that represents the optimal
situation of a nonresident agent recruiting an athlete. These answers, which
represent the majority of responses, suggest that the actions of nonresident,
unregistered agents satisfy the "minimum contacts test."
96. Id at 469-70. See also Burger King v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
The court of appeals concluded that "U]urisdiction under these circumstances would offend the
fundamental fairness which is the touchstone of due process." Id
97. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 462, 470.
98. Id at 479.
99. Id. at 480.
100. ML at 481.
101. IM. at 480.
102. The Cincinnati Bar Association's Sports Law Committee consists of a variety of sports
agents. The majority of the agents work with football and baseball professionals.
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A. Background
The questionnaire proposed this scenario: An athlete is coming out
of high school or college to turn professional. How will you, as an agent,
recruit the athlete?
B. Questions and Majority Responses
i. Prior Negotiations
Question: Where do and what type of negotiations take place when
trying to sign an amateur athlete?
Answer: Agents normally conduct negotiations in the state where the
athlete attends school. The negotiations take place over the phone and in
person. The discussion ranges from the athlete's education to the possible
monetary amount the athlete can expect.
I. Future Contemplations
Question: Upon initial signing, do agents contemplate a long standing
relationship with the athlete?
Answer: Agents anticipate that a business relationship will be long
standing. The agent knows that a recommendation from well-represented
professional athletes will promote business faster than any other means.
iii. Terms of the Contract
Question: What type of contract does an athlete sign with an agent?
Answer: The initial contract is a representation agreement.
Question: In any initial contract, does a clause appear that states the
agent will come under a certain state's jurisdiction?
Answer: These contract terms normally explain which state's jurisdic-
tion applies. The state is usually where the athlete played his sport.
iv. Actual Course of Business
Question: If an athlete signs, will the agent conduct business in the
agent's or athlete's principal state?
Answer: The agent will normally conduct business in the state where
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the athlete plays his sport.
C. Analysis
The answers to the questionnaire seem to indicate that the agents
would meet the "minimum contacts test." In the optimal situation, the
nonresident, unregistered agent who negotiates and ultimately signs an
athlete in one of the fifteen states with athlete agent laws will be subject to
personal jurisdiction in that state. It is debatable whether the "minimum
contacts test" will be satisfied where a nonresident, unregistered agent con-
ducts negotiations in one of the fifteen states but signs the contract in
another state. This answer can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Naturally, because of the uncertain nature of the law, a nonresident,
unregistered agent should remain informed of each state's laws.
3. Visiting an Amateur Athlete
The nonresident, unregistered agent should be able to visit an amateur
athlete in one of the fifteen states without having to pay registration
fees0 3 or post surety bonds."° The Seventh Circuit in Kaye-Martin v.
Brooks"es established the principle that a nonresident who visits a state to
conduct contract negotiations does not come under that state's in personam
jurisdiction because this action does not satisfy the "minimum contacts
test."'" Therefore, a nonresident athlete agent should be able to visit an
amateur athlete in his or her home state simply to discuss services and
benefits and not be subject to lawsuits. However, an agent who signs a
representation agreement or agrees to any other written or oral contract in
the amateur athlete's home state may be subject to in personam jurisdic-
tion.107
103. See supra note 64.
104. ALA. CODE § 8-26-14 (Supp. 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-48-202 (Michie Supp. 1989);
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1519 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-13 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1991);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.6 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-9 (1989 &
Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-72 (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62 (1989); TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-519 (Michie Supp.
1990).
105. 267 F.2d. 394 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 832 (1959).
106. Id. at 397-98.
107. See id.
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In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,0 s the Supreme Court
implied that a person who conducts business in a state may establish
minimum contacts in the forum state and be subject to in personam
jurisdiction if an injury occurs in the forum state."° If a nonresident
athlete agent comes to the athlete's home state and acts improperly, he or
she is conducting business and has potentially caused injury in the forum
state. Therefore, the agent could establish minimum contacts under the
World-Wide Volkswagen standard.
Arguably, the World-Wide Volkswagen decision should not apply to
nonresident agents merely involved in contract negotiations. The Court
implied that a nonresident who sells or advertises products in a state could
satisfy the "minimum contacts test" for a products liability suit, but not for
a contracts suit." 0 Thus, the World-Wide Volkswagen case should not
extend the doctrine of products liability to nonresident agents when their
actions are limited to negotiations. The nonresident, unregistered agent
who negotiates and signs an athlete to a contract in a state with an athlete
agent registration law will be subject to in personam jurisdiction. The
agent should also be subject to in personam jurisdiction if he or she
negotiates with an athlete and agrees to an oral contract. However, such
an agent is not subject to in personam jurisdiction if he or she only visits
the athlete to explain services.
C. The Need for Federal Legislation
The possibility of the Due Process or Commerce Clause limiting the
enforcement of athlete agent registration laws should serve as notice to
Congress that current state laws are inadequate. The following is an
example of the difficulty in determining which state has jurisdiction:
If an agent lives in Connecticut, has an office in New York, and
is seeking to represent an athlete who just finished college in
Oklahoma, was chosen by the Dallas Cowboys in the NFL draft,
and whose mother lives in Los Angeles, and the mother, son,
and prospective agent meet in California to discuss representa-
tion, which state can properly assert jurisdiction?...
Unless there is federal legislation, more states might be prompted to
108. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
109. 1d at 295-96.
110. Mdat 297.
111. David L. Dunn, Note, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First It Hasn't Succeeded,
Try Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 1031, 1065 (1988).
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pass athlete agent registration laws. These state-by-state regulations will
impose an even greater financial burden on agents and will in all probabili-
ty violate the Commerce Clause.112 If Congress waits for an individual
to challenge these laws, it may be too late for certain athletes.
An [amateur] athlete may therefore miss the opportunity to
speak to the agent best suited to represent him because the agent
may choose not to "spend a lot of money and time just for a
shot." Instead of protecting the [amateur] athlete, a state
regulation may place the athlete at a disadvantage to those
athletes in states without regulations. Preemptive federal regula-
tion would replace multiple application and fee requirements
.... Competent representatives would not be priced out of the
market and athletes would have a broader field of agents from
which to choose." 3
Congress would best serve the interest of state legislators by framing
legislation similar to the Uniform Commercial Code or Model Penal Code
which provide uniformity and consistency. Such legislation would inform
and regulate agents and protect athletes.
IV. PROPOSAL
Individual state athlete agent registration laws are ripe for attack under
the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. A well drafted Model
Federal Sports Act should eliminate these concerns." 4
The proposed Model Federal Sports Act ("Act"), as federal legislation,
would be not be subject to the Commerce Clause. As well, a blanket
federal act would unify the states on the issue of athlete agent registration
laws, making consistent and simpler law. As well, the Act will not allow
an unregistered agent to visit an athlete, explain benefits and services, and
orally or in writing agree to represent the athlete."' But the Act should
survive a Due Process Clause challenge because it allows an unregistered
agent to visit an athlete."
6
The Act uses arbitration to settle agreement or contract disputes
between athletes and agents and to settle disputes concerning denial,
112. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
113. Dunn, supra note 111, at 1066 (footnotes omitted).
114. See attached appendix.
115. Id § 100-6(g).
116. Id. § 100-2.
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revocation or suspension of an agent's certification.' Arbitration should
provide a quick and final resolution to most disputes. The arbitration
procedure provides agents and amateur athletes with constitutional due
process. "An agreement to arbitrate is basically a contract between the
parties in which they promise to resolve disputes by non-judicial
means." ' Arbitration is a time-saving device that also saves money by
avoiding court proceedings and attorneys fees." 9 Additionally, arbitration
proceedings are kept out of the public eye and give disputants a choice in
the selection of the arbitrator."2
The issues the parties may arbitrate depend on their agreement. Under
the proposed Act, an agent will submit to arbitration issues concerning
denial, revocation, or suspension of an agent's certification.' 21 The Act
allows the amateur athlete and agent to define in their agreement or contract
which other disputes they wish submitted to arbitration.
Congress would greatly benefit amateur athletes, agents, the NCAA
and other collegiate sports association member schools by passing a Federal
Sports Act. The adoption and implementation of the Act will allow the
states to retain jurisdictional control over unscrupulous agents and allow the
individual agents a fair playing field in every state.
117. Id. §§ 100-3(1)(e) & 100-4(2-3).
118. JoHN C. WmsTART & Cym H. LoWELL, Tm LAW OF SPORTS 408 (1979).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See attached Appendix § 100-4.
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APPENDIX
[PROPOSED]
MODEL FEDERAL SPORTS ACT1
22
§ 100-1 Definitions
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Person" means an individual, company, corporation, association,
partnership or other legal entity.
(b) "Athlete agent" means a person who, directly or indirectly, recruits
or solicits an athlete to enter into an agent contract or professional sport
services contract or who for a fee procures, offers, promises or attempts to
obtain employment for an athlete with a professional sports team.
(c) "Agent contract" means any contract or agreement under which an
athlete authorizes an athlete agent to negotiate or solicit on behalf of the
athlete with one or more professional sports teams for the employment of
the athlete by one or more professional sports teams.
(d) "Financial services contract" means any contract or agreement
under which an athlete authorizes an athlete agent to provide financial
services for the athlete, including the making and execution of investment
and other financial decisions by the agent on behalf of the athlete.
(e) "Student-athlete" means an athlete enrolled at an institution of
higher education who is eligible, or who is receiving partial or full athletic
scholarship assistance and who may in the future be eligible, to participate
in intercollegiate sports contests as a member of a sports team at the
institution which is a member of the NCAA, the National Association of
Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) or any other collegiate athletic organiza-
tion. The term "Student-athlete" shall also include athletes who are under
twenty-one (21) years of age and who may in the future be eligible to
participate in intercollegiate sports contests as a member of a sports team
122. Unless otherwise footnoted, this proposal is largely based upon, and in parts specifically
derived from MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 7341-1 to 7341-23 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
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at an institution which is a member of the NCAA, NAIA or other collegiate
athletic association.
(f) "Registered athlete agent" means an athlete agent registered with
the Commissioner of Sports under the provisions of this Act.
(g) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of Sports.
(2) For purposes of this chapter, the execution by an athlete of a personal
service contract with the owner or prospective owner of a professional
sports team for the purpose of future athletic services is equivalent to
employment with a professional sports team.
§ 100-2 Effect of non-registration
(1) An unregistered athlete agent may only contact a student-athlete to
explain his/her services in accordance with the conduct as set forth in this
chapter." An unregistered athlete agent whose conduct violates this Act
is subject to prosecution according to the provisions of this chapter.
124
(2) A registered athlete agent may contact, directly or indirectly, a student-
athlete in accordance with the conduct as set forth in this chapter."z
§ 100-3 Application for registration
(1) A written application for registration or renewal must be made to the
Commissioner on a form prescribed by the Commissioner and shall state:
(a) The name of the applicant and the address of the applicant's
principal place of business.
(b) The business or occupation engaged in by the applicant for each
of the five (5) years immediately preceding the date of application.
(c) The names and addresses of three (3) character references.
123. This part of the Act allows an unregistered agent to visit an amateur athlete.
124. Id.
125. This part of the Act allows a registered agent to contact an amateur athlete.
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(d) The names and addresses of all persons, except bona fide
employees on stated salaries, who are financially interested as partners,
associates or profit sharers in the operation of the business of the athlete
agent.
(e) That any disputes arising out of agreements or contracts between
a student-athlete and a registered athlete agent and any disputes concerning
denial, revocation, or suspension of a registered athlete agent's certification
shall be resolved in accordance with the arbitration procedures as set forth
in this chapter.
(2) A registration is valid from July 1 of one (1) year through June 30 of
the following year. An initial registration is valid until the first June 30th
following the date of registration. Registration may be renewed by filing
of a renewal application.
(3) An annual registration fee shall not exceed $200 and shall be paid by
the athlete agent to the Commissioner to be deposited in a trust fund to be
established for the enforcement of the Act.
§ 100-4 Refusal to issue or renew registration; hearing
(1) The Commissioner may, pursuant to an impartial arbitration hearing
conducted as provided in subsection (3) of this section, refuse to issue or
renew a registration upon proof that the applicant or his representative:
(a) Has made false or misleading statements of a material nature in his
application for registration or renewal;
(b) Has ever been convicted of fraud, embezzlement, a felonious theft
or any other crime involving a misappropriation of funds, which would
render him unfit to serve in a fiduciary capacity; or
(c) Has engaged in conduct which violates or causes an athlete to
violate any rule or regulation promulgated by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association or the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics
governing athletes and their relationship with athlete agents.
(2) The Commissioner may, pursuant to an impartial arbitration hearing as
provided in subsection (3) of this section, suspend or revoke a registration
for a violation of this chapter or any rule adopted pursuant to this chapter.
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(3) Steps for an arbitration process:
(a) "A party files a demand for arbitration with the Commissioner, and
a case administrator is assigned to follow the case through to its conclu-
sion.'' 6
(b) "Other parties named in the demand are notified and replies
requested."' 2
(c) "The case administrator reviews independent arbitrator qualifica-
tions and selects an individual or individuals suitable for the particular
case."
12
(d) "The list of names is sent to the parties, each of whom numbers
in order of preference those persons it finds acceptable."''
(e) "An arbitrator is selected by the administrator according to the
mutual desires of the parties. If the parties are unable to agree, the
Commissioner may appoint an arbitrator."
130
(f) "The administrator arranges a hearing date and location convenient
to the parties and to the arbitrator.'
' 31
(g) "At the hearing, testimony and documents are submitted to the
arbitrator, and witnesses are questioned and cross examined."'
32
(h) After the close of the hearing, the arbitrator evaluates the evidence
and issues a written binding award.13 3  "[C]opies shall be sent to the
parties by the case administrator."'"
(i) Where appropriate, damage awards may include nominal, compen-
satory, and punitive damages.
126. AmmCAN ARBIrRATION ASS'N, Resolving Your Disputes, at 9.
127. Id
128. Id
129. Id.
130. AMEIucAN ARBm'RATION ASS'N, Resolving Your Disputes, at 9.
131. 1d.
132. Ld.
133. 1d.
134. 1&
19931
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§ 100-5 Surety bond
(1) Before the issuance or renewal of a certificate of registration, an athlete
agent that enters into a financial services contract with an athlete must
deposit with the Commissioner a surety bond in the sum of one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000), payable to the state and conditioned that the
person applying for the registration will comply with this chapter, will pay
all amounts due any individual or group of individuals when the person or
the person's representative or agent has received those amounts, and will
pay all damages caused to any athlete by reason of the intentional
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, or any unlawful or negligent act or omis-
sion by the registered athlete agent or the agent's representative or
employee while acting within the scope of the financial services contract.
The athlete agent shall maintain the bond until two (2) years after the date
on which the athlete agent ceases to engage in the provision of financial
services for an athlete. This subsection does not limit the recovery of
damages to the amount of the surety bond.
(2) If an athlete agent has entered into a financial services contract with an
athlete and fails to file a new bond with the Commissioner not later than
the thirtieth day after date of receipt of a notice of cancellation issued by
the surety of the bond, the Commissioner shall suspend the certificate of
registration issued to that athlete agent under the bond until the athlete
agent files a new surety bond with the Commissioner.
(3) An athlete agent that enters into an agent contract only is not required
to meet the bond requirements of this section.
§ 100-6 Restricted activities
An athlete agent shall not:
(a) Sell, transfer or give away any interest in or the right to participate in
the profits of an athlete agent without prior written disclosure to the
Commissioner;
(b) Publish or cause to be published any false, fraudulent or misleading
information, representation, notice or advertisement;
(c) Advertise by means of cards, circulars or signs, or in newspapers and
other publications, or use letterheads, receipts or blanks, unless the
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advertisement, letterhead, receipt or blank is printed and contains the
registered name and address of the athlete agent;
(d) Intentionally give any false information or intentionally make any
false promises or representations to any student-athlete;
(e) Divide fees with or receive compensation from a professional sports
league or franchise, or its representative or employee in regard to a
particular student-athlete;
(f) Enter into any agreement, written or oral, by which the athlete agent
offers anything of value, including the rendition of free or reduced-price
legal services, to any employee of an institution of higher learning located
in this state in return for the referral of any clients by that employee;
(g) Except as provided in Section 100-7, enter into any agreement, written
or oral, by which the athlete agent will represent the athlete, or give
anything of value to a student-athlete, until after completion of the student-
athlete's last intercollegiate sports contest, including post season games.
For the purpose of this paragraph (g), an athlete agent may not enter into
an agreement before the student-athlete's last intercollegiate contest that
purports to take effect at a time after that contest is completed.
§ 100-7 Interviews at institutions of higher learning
If an institution of higher education elects to sponsor athlete agent
interviews on its campus during the student-athlete's final year of collegiate
eligibility, a registered [or unregistered] athlete agent may interview with
the student-athlete to discuss his representation of the student-athlete in the
marketing of the student-athlete's athletic ability or reputation. The
registered or unregistered athlete agent shall strictly adhere to the specific
rules of each separate electing institution with regard to the time, place and
duration of the registered athlete agent interviews. The interviews must be
conducted in that final year during a period not to exceed thirty (30)
consecutive days.
§ 100-8 Violations; penalties
(1) (a) A registered athlete agent commits an offense if he or she
knowingly or intentionally violates the provisions of Section 100-6.
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(b) An athlete agent commits an offense if he or she knowingly or
intentionally violates the provisions of Section 100-2 or the provisions of
Section 100-6.
(c) A person commits an offense if he or she knowingly or intention-
ally either files a false sworn complaint or gives false sworn testimony
concerning activities covered by this chapter.
(d) Conviction of an offense under this subsection (1) shall be
punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by
imprisonment of not more than two years, or both.
(2) An athlete agent who is convicted under the provisions of subsection
(1) of this section, shall, upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction:
(a) Forfeit any right of repayment of anything of value either received
by an athlete as an inducement to enter into any agent contract or received
by a student-athlete before completion of the student-athlete's last
intercollegiate sports contest.
(b) Pay a refund of any consideration paid to the athlete agent on an
athlete's behalf.
(c) Pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.
(3) Any agent contract negotiated by an athlete agent who has failed to
comply with this chapter is void and unenforceable.
§ 100-9 Rules to be adopted
The Commissioner may adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions
of this chapter.
§ 100-10 Compliance date for registration
An athlete agent is not required to be registered and is. not required to
comply with this chapter until its adoption.
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§ 100-11 Liability for loss of collegiate eligibility
If a student-athlete loses his or her eligibility to participate in sports
sanctioned by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National
Association of Intercollegiate Athletics or any other collegiate sports
organization, as a result of such student-athlete's contact with an athlete
agent, the institution of higher education that such student-athlete attended
shall have a cause of action against such student-athlete and the athlete
agent of such athlete for reasonable reimbursement for the costs the
institution incurred in providing a scholarship to such athlete, loss of
revenue and other damages suffered by such institution as a direct result of
such student-athlete's loss of eligibility.
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